

HOFFMAN, Senior Judge

Defendant-Appellant Anthony Anderson appeals his convictions of residential entry, a Class D felony, and theft, a Class D felony. We affirm.

Anderson raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support the convictions.

On April 3, 2005, Timmy Vanhorn moved into a house in an Indianapolis neighborhood. The two-bedroom house was furnished and had electricity. Although Vanhorn had stayed with his mother at her residence during the month of October 2005, he had checked on the house periodically and had collected the mail.

At about 1:30 p.m. on November 3, 2005, Vanhorn returned to the house after leaving work. Upon entering the house, Vanhorn found Anderson, a complete stranger, lying on the sofa watching television. Vanhorn asked Anderson who he was, and Anderson responded by asking Vanhorn who he was. Vanhorn stated that he lived in the house, and Anderson countered that he lived in the house. Vanhorn stepped outside and called the police because he had not given Anderson permission to enter his house.

Anderson left the house and walked down the street, carrying his clothes in Vanhorn's gym bag that he had taken from the house. When the police stopped Anderson, he explained that he was homeless, he thought the house was vacant, so he pushed the door open, went inside, and took a nap.

Anderson was arrested and charged with theft and residential entry. At the bench trial, he testified that he thought the home was abandoned and that he had stayed there 1½ days. The trial court found Anderson guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to concurrent 545-day sentences.

Anderson was charged with and found guilty of residential entry for “knowingly” breaking and entering into Vanhorn’s house. A person acts “knowingly” if “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the circumstances and facts of each case. *Mitchell v. State*, 557 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. 1990). A person is presumed to have intended the reasonable results of his own acts. *Heavrin v. State*, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. 1996).

A person commits the offense of residential entry when he knowingly or intentionally breaks and enters the dwelling of another person. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. Anderson argues that the State failed to show that his breaking and entering was a knowing intrusion into the house of another. He argues that he believed the house to be vacant at the time he broke and entered therein. He cites his testimony that windows were broken, that the house looked ransacked and dirty, that the house was cold, and that there was trash strewn throughout the house.

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. *Bowlds v. State*, 834 N.E.2d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We review only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the trial court’s verdict, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. *Id.*

The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s verdict shows Anderson entered A home that had (1) intact windows; (2) electricity; (3) a working television that received channels through a dish; (4) furniture, including a sofa, table, and bed; and (5) a working

refrigerator. The evidence further shows that Vanhorn owned the house. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding Anderson guilty of the knowing breaking and entry of Vanhorn's home. There was certainly evidence to show that the house was not vacant, and the trial court was not prohibited from refusing to give weight or assign credibility to Anderson's testimony.

Furthermore, we note that even if Anderson thought the house was vacant or abandoned, the trial court could have concluded that Anderson knew that the property did not belong to him and therefore had to belong to "another person," whether that person was an individual, corporation bank or the City of Indianapolis. *See* Ind. Code § 35-41-1-22 (defining "person" as "a human being, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, unincorporated association, or governmental entity").

A person commits the offense of theft when he knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2. Anderson contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he committed theft by knowingly taking Vanhorn's gym bag. Anderson argues that the bag could have been the one given to him by a church that provided him with necessities. We note, however, that Vanhorn identified the bag as his own. The trial court did not err in crediting Vanhorn's testimony, and we refuse to reweigh the evidence.

Anderson further contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knowingly took a bag belonging to "another person." He emphasizes that the bag

appeared abandoned. The bag was taken from the bedroom of another person's house, and we refuse to give weight to Anderson's abandonment theory.

Affirmed.

SULLIVAN, J., and CRONE, J., concur.